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Abstract 
Political geography has an established tradition of engaging with religiously-driven geopolitik. 
However, despite the remarkable growth in professed atheist beliefs in recent decades and the 
popular expression of an imagined geopolitical binary between secular/atheist and religious societies, 
the geopolitics of irreligion have received almost no attention among academic practitioners. This 
paper outlines the core tenets of ‘New Atheist’ philosophy, before addressing how its key 
representatives have taken positions on the ‘Global War on Terror.’ In particular, we critically 
interrogate the works of Richard Dawkins, Sam Harris, and the late Christopher Hitchens and identify a 
belligerent geopolitical imagination which posits a civilizational clash between an existentially-
threatened secular, liberal West with responsibility to use extraordinary violence to protect itself and 
the world from a backwards oriental Islam. The paper concludes with four possible explanations for 
the paradox that the New Atheist critique of religion for being violent acts itself as a geopolitical 
incitement to violence.  In so doing, we seek to navigate debates about the nature and purpose of 
critical geopolitical research given that the historical, intellectual and political contexts in which it was 
formed have changed.  
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Introduction – Imagine no Religion? 
 In February 2013 Richard Dawkins, retired biologist and author of global best-seller 
The God Delusion, tweeted ‘Haven't read Koran so couldn't quote chapter & verse like I can 
for Bible. But often say Islam greatest force for evil today.’i  Dismissing criticism that it was 
unscientific to make such a startling claim in ignorance of the primary source material, he 
tweeted back, ‘Of course you can have an opinion about Islam without having read Qur'an. 
You don't have to read Mein Kampf to have an opinion about nazism.’ ii 
These comments triggered a debate concerning whether the arguments of Dawkins 
and likeminded atheist authors had, as Lean (2013) contended on salon.com, ‘slid seamlessly 
into xenophobia.’ He claimed that this ‘rant’ had exposed ‘a disturbing Islamophobic streak’ 
in the work not only of Dawkins, but fellow best-selling ‘New Atheist’ writers Sam Harris and 
recently-deceased Christopher Hitchens (Lean 2013). Writing for Al-Jazeera, Hussain went 
further, accusing this group of giving ‘a veneer of scientific respectability to today's 
politically-useful bigotry.’ To this extent, he argued, they were the heirs of the European 
Enlightenment’s ‘scientific racism’ (Hussain 2013). Referring to outspoken ‘New Atheist’ 
support of George W. Bush’s ‘War on Terror,’ Hussain added that this racism was being used 
‘to justify the wars of aggression, torture and extra-judicial killings.’ 
 This exchange illustrates and frames the key concern of this article, the geopolitics of 
‘New Atheism.’ We enquire how the critical geopolitics of religion and religious geopolitics 
(Sturm 2013) can make a distinctive contribution to assessing what we term ‘the John 
Lennon thesis’ – that an atheist utopia in which we can imagine ‘no religion’ would 
necessarily be one where ‘all the people’ could live ‘life in peace.’iii A geographical version of 
this thesis has recently been advanced by Simon Springer (2016), who argues that atheism is 
a better basis for pacific spatial emancipation than is religion. 
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We begin by asking what the nature and purpose of critical geopolitical research is, 
given that the historical, intellectual and political contexts in which it was formed have 
changed. Arguing that there remains a role for the textual study of elite militaristic mappings 
of global space, we then examine the relationship between geographical study and religion, 
and note the lack of geographical engagement with atheism. We briefly sketch some notes 
on the meaning and history of atheism to provide context to the ‘New Atheists’ as inheritors 
of a Western Enlightenment tradition. The substantive section of the paper then examines 
their writings on the War on Terror, showing how their stark Orientalist imaginative 
geographies (Gregory, 2004) acted as an incitement to violence. The conclusion attempts to 
make sense of the apparently-paradoxical finding that New Atheism’s most prominent 
spokesmen criticise religion as a cause of political violence, yet openly advocate contentious 
military resolutions to the geopolitical scenarios they construct. 
For New Atheist thinkers, the argument that religions begets violence is not merely 
historical. For them, the belief that violence is ontogenetic to religion translates into a 
normative vision that is expressed in political and geopolitical terms, framing contemporary 
geopolitical insecurities as the inevitable consequence of a single bitter root – religion. This 
vision leads some of them to articulate vociferous support for the Bush and Blair-era War on 
Terror. This reduction and repackaging of complex and multi-layered geopolitical issues as a 
vociferously-trumpeted essentialism is, in its illusory monocausality and seductive simplicity, 
as misleading as the classical geopolitics of Mackinder and Ratzel.  
The specific question addressed by this article is: “What is the relationship between 
geopolitics and New Atheism?” This focus is important because (somewhat unusually for 
public intellectuals) New Atheist writers not only trumpeted support for the ’War on Terror,’ 
but have also reached a mass market with their geopolitical visions by ‘stratospheric’ global 
book sales (Sparrow 2015). There is thus a disciplinary as well as a political imperative to 
interrogate their work and thereby contribute to considering the broader question of how 
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deeply-held beliefs are productive of geopolitical visions of peace or violence (Megoran 
2013). We begin with the relationship between geographical thinking and irreligion. 
 
Critical geopolitics: beyond the text, beyond the Global War on Terror?  
This paper is a critical geopolitical analysis of texts about Islam and the so-called 
Global War on Terror (GWOT) produced by New Atheist writers mostly in the first decade of 
the twenty-first century. Because the focus of critical geopolitics has shifted to conflict zones 
since the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, and because critical geopolitics itself has 
developed significantly since that period, it is perfectly legitimate to ask whether the analysis 
that we undertake in the way that we do is still both politically useful and intellectually valid. 
Before continuing, it is therefore necessary to address these concerns: and in so doing, we 
make an argument for the continued relevance and indeed the urgent importance of a 
critical geopolitical engagement with elite textual mappings of global space in core capitalist 
states. It is a truism that how we see the world affects how we act in it. Critical geopolitics 
translates this basic insight into the contention that our imaginative mappings of global 
space affect the way we see ourselves and others and thus ‘do’ global politics. 
Critical geopolitics emerged in the late 1980s and early 1990s as “the moniker for the 
writings of a loose assemblage of political geographers concerned to challenge the taken for 
granted geographical specifications of politics on the large scale” (Dalby, 2010: 280). Rooted 
in critical International Relations theory’s rejection of realist paradigms of understanding the 
international (Krause and Williams, 1997), its particular contribution to this project is the 
interrogation of how geographical reasoning is used in the service of state power (Dalby 
1996: 656). Emphasising the systematic analysis of texts as discourse (Toal 2003), its initial 
concerns were to critically revisit foundational classical geopolitical sources (Ó Tuathail 
1996), and use this analysis to critique reworkings of classical geopolitical reasoning in the 
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Cold War (Dalby 1990, Sharp 2000) and post-Cold War world (Campbell, 1998). 
From 2001 onwards, GWOT occasioned a renewed and urgent reapplication of 
critical geopolitical thought to the mappings of global space that allowed the Al-Qaeda 
Islamist terror attacks of September 2001 to be translated into the disastrous US and UK-led 
invasion of Iraq in 2003. This invasion provoked a global upsurge in retaliatory Islamist 
terrorism, precipitating the rise of the apocalyptic and genocidal Islamic State group 
(Cockburn, 2014). ISIS proclaimed the reestablishment of a Caliphate whose tyranny rapidly 
expanded from Iraq to fill unstable voids from Nigeria and Libya to Syria and Afghanistan, as 
well inspiring murder across Europe, North America and Australasia. How did a deadly 
criminal attack by a marginal and extreme militant Muslim group lead to this (ongoing) 
catastrophe? The conceptual and analytical tools developed by critical geopolitics proved 
adept at providing answers, explaining how the mapping of 9/11 onto a global cartographic 
imagination of safe and dangerous places made sense of a complex world, reasserted 
identities, and justified the cataclysmic violence of the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan 
(Dalby 2003). Further, these texts insisted with Dalby that “geopolitical scripts could have 
been otherwise” (Dalby 2003, 65): in other words, these outcomes were not inevitable and 
critical geopolitical scholarship has a moral and political obligation to challenge them and 
thus point the way to less violent ways of doing global politics.  
Critical geopolitics has been primarily shaped, then, by the challenge of using Critical 
International Relations theory to interrogate how elite texts discursively geo-graphed three 
major conflicts: the imperial rivalries culminating in the 1914-18 and 1939-45 World Wars, 
the Cold War, and the Global War on Terror. Critical geopolitics could have been a niche 
concern of a small number of scholars located in a particular geopolitical and theoretical 
moment in the 1990s. However, its demonstrable purchase on contemporary events meant it 
became more mainstream in the academy. Given both the changing nature of global 
geopolitics, and the broader range of perspectives and topics with which it engaged, it was 
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inevitable that the frameworks set by its beginnings would prove inadequate, opening the 
field to a range of critiques and new directions. 
 The majority of these interventions critique the inadequacy of critical geopolitics’ 
perceived focus on particularly textual representations as a key to understanding elite 
geopolitical thinking, often expressed as a frustration that the materiality of the ‘everyday’ is 
obscured. For Thrift (2000), in a key intervention drawing on non-representational theory, 
our ‘mesmerised attention to texts’ obscures attention to ‘little things’ such as the human 
body and the dialogic significance of the utterances themselves. Meanwhile Amoore (2006) 
and Bialasiewicz (2012) show how bodies become the expressions of geopolitical space 
through militarised and technologized apparatuses and infrastructures of surveillance and 
control. At the same time the emotional (Pain 2009) and affective (Carter and McCormack 
2006; Toal 2003) dimensions of understanding geopolitics have been advanced.  
Critical Geopolitics has been faulted for an ethnocentric focus on the international 
relations of core capitalist states (Megoran, 2006). Methodologically, researchers have shown 
how ethnography can illuminate the experiences of non-elites in non-spectacular contexts 
(Megoran, 2006; McConnell, 2009) and emphasised the need to explore how texts circulate 
and are used (Dittmer and Dodds, 2008). Geographers have repeatedly insisted on the 
importance of locating geopolitical discourses in the structural development of states in the 
capitalist world (Agnew, 2003; Flint and Taylor, 2011) and that critical geopolitics wrestle 
more seriously with the materiality of the world (Squire, 2015).  Kuus (2008) and Dittmer 
(2014) have pointed to the usefulness of exploring how elites actually do international 
relations as individuals in their everyday lives. Comics and cartoons (Rech, 2014), films 
(Power, 2007) and other non-textual cultural productions have been mined for their 
geopolitical significance. A range of scholars have pushed at a disembodied critical 
geopolitics’s ethical commitments (Dowler and Sharp, 2001; Megoran, 2008; Hyndman, 
2010) and the extent to which it has adequately sought to seek peaceful alternatives to the 
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cartographies of violence it critiques (Megoran 2010; Jones and Sage 2010).  
This is far from an exhaustive list of relevant authors or themes, but is rather used to 
indicate the multiplicity of topics, methods, questions and theoretical and conceptual 
traditions that have gathered under the banner of critical geopolitics. This multiplicity raises 
an obvious question: is it possible and necessary to devise some new unifying framework 
and research agenda to draw the increasingly disparate threads of Critical Geopolitical 
thought together? 
Jason Dittmer would apparently answer this question in the affirmative. Writing with 
Nicholas Gray in 2010, he criticised popular geopolitics’ focus on elite texts, and called for 
the “adoption of a new research agenda” emphasising “everyday life” that “moves away 
from the deconstruction of texts and instead shifts to the practices of everyday life” (Dittmer 
and Gray, 2010: 1664, 1674). Although this paper contained the caveat that they were not 
“trying to impose a new theoretical orthodoxy” (ibid: 1664), in 2014 Dittmer makes a 
sophisticated attempt to reposition critical geopolitics by using assemblage/complexity 
theory as “a way to integrate a wide range of tensions already extant within the critical 
geopolitical project” (Dittmer, 2014: 396).  However the insistence that the broad-ranging 
and exciting field be tied to a single moment in recent Western thought, and the ethical 
questions opened up by its speculative posthumanism, will encounter resistance. 
In contrast to Dittmer, other scholars have overwhelmingly answered the question in 
the negative. Gearóid Ó Tuathail is almost dismissive of the question, remarking that “Critical 
Geopolitics is no more than a general gathering place for various critiques of the multiple 
geopolitical discourses and practices that characterize modernity.”  Power and Campbell 
(2010) argue that Critical Geopolitics is not a single analytical or methodological endeavour, 
but rather a “corpus of scholarship” which “encompasses various ways of unpacking the 
tropes and epistemologies of dominant geographies and scriptings of political space” (Power 
and Campbell, 2010: 244). Fraser Macdonald (in Macdonald, Hughes and Dodds 2010: 628) 
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describes the continued circulation of classical geopolitical ideas as “the ‘undead’ character 
of classical geopolitics.” He accepts that interventions using Non-Representational Theory 
have been useful and that there is room for them, but argues that if this means that Critical 
Geopolitics loses sight of classical geopolitics or becomes uninterested in militaristic 
mappings of global space “then it risks becoming an academic fad” (MacDonald, Hughes and 
Dodds 2010: 318). This consensus is summed up by Newman, who contends that “There is 
no one geopolitics, nor is there any need for such a rigid framework” (Newman, 2006, 627-
8). 
 Nonetheless, Simon Dalby sounds a note of caution. Although he agrees that “there 
is nothing close to a consensus” on what ‘Critical Geopolitics’ designates (Dalby, 2010: 280), 
he opines that if it “is to have any coherence within the discipline, it is still about trying to 
challenge militarist mappings of global space” (Dalby, 2010, 281). He takes a particular 
objection to Thrift’s oft-cited intervention, for ‘his suggested agenda eviscerates the political 
purpose of critical geopolitics’ (282). He continues that “it is frequently not exactly clear how 
this engagement with… the lived experiences of people in various dangerous contexts, 
necessarily connects to the problematization of the discourses used to legitimate the 
practices of violence” (283). Thus for Dalby the issue is not how to create a unified 
theoretical framework (and especially not one drawn around theories that he suspects 
delegimitise critiques of violence); but rather, in a world where the ability of great powers to 
enact violence remains real, how the geographical sense-making behind those strategies can 
be contested. 
 Jenkins and Woodward (2012) follow Dalby, acknowledging that the textually-
orientated, representation-focussed approach of critical geopolitics has been challenged by 
arguments for a renewal of approaches to geopolitics more attentive to its lived, experiential 
dimensions. However, their research uncovers that memoirs (written by both officers and 
private soldiers) have a key position in articulating morality and meaning of the Afghanistan 
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war. Like Dalby, they see the unpacking of militarist mappings of global space as a core 
concern of the critical geopolitics project, and argue the case for ‘the continued salience of 
textual sources in critical geopolitical inquiry’ (Jenkins and Woodward, 2012: 495). 
 We agree with this position. In a world that remains extraordinarily violent, we 
contend that the task of critically understanding mappings of global space remains vital. We 
therefore recognise both the necessity and value of the multiplicity of questions, approaches 
and methods which have been brought to enhance and refine the project of Critical 
Geopolitics – so long as they serve to illuminate rather than obscure questions of power and 
violence.  Furthermore, given the ongoing effects of the disastrous GWOT, it is still necessary 
to study the imaginative cartographies of those who supported it by encoding 9/11 in 
certain ways (as we do here, with the New Atheists). And we insist that the analysis of texts 
alone remains one valid avenue of research, amongst many. There is still a role for Critical 
Geopolitics, because before wars can be fought, they have to be thought. 
 
The geopolitics of (ir)religion 
Over the past decade a growing literature on the critical geopolitics of religion has 
interrogated the ways in which active agents derive political geographical visions from 
religious beliefs (Agnew 2010; Amarasingam 2010; Megoran 2006; Haynes 2013; Dittmer 
2013; Sturm 2013). This work has shown that theological visions and spiritual practices 
inform and reproduce spatial imaginaries of global politics that variously reinforce (Megoran 
2006; Sturm 2008; Agnew 2010; Dittmer and Sturm 2010) or challenge (Gerhardt 2008; 
Megoran 2012) violence. 
A notable absence in this work is any consideration of what we call the ‘geopolitics of 
atheism.’ If, as the literature on religion shows, theistic systems are indeed sometimes 
productive of violent geopolitical visions, does it follow logically that atheistic ones therefore 
lend themselves to a more ‘pacific geopolitics’? (Megoran, 2010). This is a question that 
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‘New Atheist’ authors answer in the affirmative. Their work is characterised not only by 
orthodox atheist arguments that the claims of theism are unnecessary and unconvincing, but 
by a particular stress that theism is innately violent and inevitably productive of 
discrimination, intolerance and war. As shall be demonstrated through an investigation of the 
three most prominent New Atheist writers – Richard Dawkins, Sam Harris, and Christopher 
Hitchens – New Atheists assert that atheism inexorably leads to more just and peaceful ways 
of human existence. 
 Surprisingly, there has been little scholarship on the relationships between atheism 
and violence or peace. In the introduction to their authoritative overview, philosophers 
Bullivant and Ruse (2013: 2) claim that academic study of atheism has been ‘unjustly 
neglected’ and that ‘significant lacunae’ persist. Even within these few studies, atheism’s 
political consequences seldom attract more than a footnote. Philosophy and sociology are 
the primarily fields for the study of atheism, but neither has been particularly interested in 
the relationship between atheism and violence or international relations. Tellingly, neither of 
the two most recent edited ‘companion’ volumes on the study of atheism contain a chapter 
on the politics of atheism (Martin 2007; Bullivant and Ruse 2013). The only scholarly 
publication we could identify which explicitly asks about the politics of New Atheism is an 
article by Kettell (2013: 62), who recognises that even within the ‘embryonic’ research on 
New Atheism, its political dimension has been ‘peculiarly absent.’ He sketches out what he 
calls ‘a baseline for further research into the political dimensions of New Atheism’ by 
focusing on its ‘organisational, strategic and public policy dimensions.’ The links between 
(New) atheism and foreign policy, geopolitics or violence more generally are absent. 
Other fields offer more promise. Historians sometimes, incidentally, touch upon the 
significance of atheism as a factor behind totalitarian violence in the twentieth century 
(Conquest 1986; Pospielovsky 1987; Husband 2000), but the political links between atheism 
and violence have rarely been investigated in any depth. Despite a burgeoning interest in 
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‘post-secularism’ (Cloke and Beaumont 2012) the only publication we are aware of by 
geographers on atheism is a chapter by Warf (2014) in an edited volume on geographies of 
religion. A welcome contribution to a neglected subject, it offers a geographical perspective 
on the traditional sociological question of the spread of atheist convictions, by mapping the 
changing distribution of atheists globally and within the United States. Warf contends that in 
contrast to “religion’s devastating social and psychological costs,” typified by war and 
multiple forms of other violence, atheism promises to be “emancipatory and self-liberating” 
(Warf 2014: 26). But as his empirical focus is on the historical geographies of atheism, 
unfortunately this claim does not move beyond assertion. To understand atheism, we need 
to turn to broader literatures.  
 
Atheisms, ancient and modern 
The word “atheism” stems from the Greek ἄθεος; a-theos, “without deities”, and can 
be simply defined as a lack of belief in supernatural agents (Bullivant and Ruse 2013: 13; 
Baggini 2003: 3). But defining atheism in this way is not as simple as it perhaps sounds. 
Despite Socrates’ memorable invocations of theos in texts such as Timmaeus, in Plato’s 
Apology the bumbling Meletus accuses Socrates of being ‘a complete atheist.’ Similarly the 
early Christians were persecuted for ‘atheism,’ not because they disbelieved in God but 
because they avowed that the Roman pantheon of gods (and, most seditiously, the Emperor 
himself) were not divine.  Clearly questions of definition and genealogy are important to the 
study of atheism, but they are beyond the scope of this article.   
Nonetheless a brief historical context is necessary. New Atheism finds its roots in the 
Enlightenment. It is only with the publication of Baron d’Holbach’s System of Nature (1770) 
that we see the first self-professed atheist text in which a-theos is presented as a 
philosophical code. Yet there were no calls for the state to adopt atheistic policies (Buckley 
1987: 322-63). Voltaire bewailed that ‘the thinking part of mankind [i.e., the atheist 
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philosophes] is confined to a very small number, and these will never disturb the peace and 
tranquillity of the world’ (quoted in Spencer and Krauze 2010: 133). 
Subsequent centuries proved Voltaire’s prediction wrong. The French Revolution 
signals the first attempt at state secularism, under a Jacobin government which sought a 
form of state atheism (Buckley 1987: 42-55). This brief experiment was terminated by 
Napoleon, who saw religion as necessary to govern populations. In contrast, the Soviet Union 
placed atheism as central to its project to remake humanity (Poliakov 1992), as manifest in 
official state policy and the formation of citizen projects with such eyebrow-raising names as 
the League of the Militant Godless (Peris 1998). However, a tension remained between 
commissars organising assaults against religion, and citizens practising ‘accommodation, 
compliance, obedience, apathy, resignation’ (Husband 2000: xi).   
Atheism as a professed ideology is therefore quite young, and there is little historical 
precedent for reflection on atheistic geopolitics. For most of its (short) history atheism was 
the preserve of a tiny elite, although scholars widely assumed that modernisation would 
gradually erode religiosity (Nielsen 1985, Berger 1999, Thrower 2000, Stenger 2009). What 
has instead happened is a twofold opposite. First, the widespread revival and politicisation of 
religion from the 1970s onwards, what Berger (1999) calls ‘the desecularisation of the world’ 
and Kepel (1994) ‘the revenge of God.’ Second, and perhaps in response to this, atheism has 
expanded as a popular ideology and manifested as a more systematic, politically-motivated, 
and popular philosophy: New Atheism. 
 
New Atheism 
Undoubtedly the most striking phenomenon in recent atheist thought is the 
emergence of ‘New Atheism,’ coined by Gary Wolf in a 2006 article ‘The Church of Non-
Believers.’ The key contributions to this literature are a series of anti-theistic, politically-
inclined books which appeared in the aftermath of 9/11: Sam Harris’ End of Faith (2004), 
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Richard Dawkins’ The God Delusion (2007), and the late Christopher Hitchens’ God is Not 
Great (2007). Although they do not invoke the term ‘New Atheist,’ they play with their 
negative characterisation as ‘aggressive and dangerous’ (Zenk 2013, 254).  
 Furthermore, little of what the New Atheists say is actually new. Ostling (2013) 
contends that most of their arguments were made with greater force and eloquence by the 
Enlightenment philosophes. Kluge (2009) argues that if we analyse the ‘old atheists’ we see 
that they covered almost all of the major themes of the New Atheists: 
 
‘materialism, the adequacy of science to solve all problems, religion as 
part of our evolutionary past, the inherent conflict of reason and faith or 
religion, the rejection of super-sensible aspects of the universe, attempts 
to disprove philosophical arguments for the existence of god, the 
concept of God as a social control mechanism, and a militant 
denunciation of religion’ (Kluge 2009:4). 
 
 If their arguments are not particularly new, why has the concept of New Atheism 
attracted such attention? We identify three reasons.  
First, New Atheists’ views that any religion is not only false, but indelibly malevolent. 
British satirical magazine Private Eye (1374, 2014) once captured this by describing Richard 
Dawkins as not so much disbelieving in God, as regarding God as a personal enemy. McGrath 
(2005: 25) calls this ‘anti-theism – an intense anger against religion, which is held to poison 
everything.’ Amarasingam (2010: 2) likewise suggests that New Atheism ‘is not entirely about 
new ideas, but a kind of evangelical revival and repacking of old ideas.’ This ‘repacking’ has 
created a ‘newfound urgency’ in the message and generated a social revival in atheism. 
Second, New Atheism is not a passive philosophy but an active product of current 
geopolitical configurations between Western liberal democracies and majority-Muslim 
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countries (including their diasporas). Huntington’s (1993: 42) ‘Clash of Civilizations’ thesis 
argued that civilizations are ‘differentiated from each other by history, language, culture, 
tradition and, most important, religion,’ and that these civilisations will increasingly be the 
basis of international conflict. Although this thesis has been relentlessly critiqued, it received 
a fillip with the growth of anti-western Jihadism as epitomised by al-Qaeda, Boko Haram and 
ISIS, and military responses led by United States Presidents who invoked the Almighty in their 
visions. It is no coincidence that the term ‘New Atheist’ was coined at this time, as the idea 
that secular Western democracies are involved in a fundamental struggle with militant Islam 
has energised a vociferous atheist critique of religion. Tellingly, Hobson (2013) argues that 
the New Atheists see Islamic terrorism as a synecdoche not merely of Islam, Abrahamic 
faiths, or monotheism, but indeed of the very concept of religion – in their eyes, a force 
inimical to peace and anathema to geopolitical security.   
Third, the media success of New Atheism. The climate of fear over violent Islamic 
jihadism has fuelled media interest in the movement (Zenk 2013; Amarasingam 2010). New 
Atheist writers are charismatic and media-savvy, while their combative and acerbic style and 
willingness to make bold generalisations about the apparent evils of religion make them 
media-friendly in a way that contrasts with the more ponderous style of academic 
philosophy. Their success at writing bestselling books and giving engaging public talks, and 
their ability to increase their global profiles through social media, have created substantial 
followings and made them minor celebrities. Dawkins and his books have appeared as a 
recognisable character and props in popular broadcasts such as South Park (#1012, 2006) 
and Family Guy (#6ACX03, 2008), and he himself has made cameo appearances in Dr Who 
(#7C/T, 2005; #198a, 2008) and The Simpsons (#RABF09, 2013). Zaimov (2013) acknowledges 
that this ‘shows that [Dawkins’] name alone is being recognized in pop culture.’  
The grouping of these thinkers under the same label has contributed to an 
unprecedented period of confidence and enthusiasm within atheism more generally (Eller 
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2009: 14). We accept that New Atheism is, like all labels, contested and over-simplifying. 
Nonetheless, because of the above historical, conceptual, and inter-referential reasons we 
will treat it here as a legitimate delimitation of a field of thought to begin a study of the 
geopolitics of atheism. The remainder of this article will thus consider the specifically 
geopolitical scripts promulgated by these thinkers. 
 
New Atheism, Islam and the War on Terror 
A recurring critique of Western operations in the War on Terror is that they are the 
military and geopolitical expression of Islamophobia, with critics characterising the war as a 
conflict not merely against terrorism but against Islam itself, written to the script of 
Huntington’s clash of civilisations. Such claims do not bear critical scrutiny. The allied 
coalition has formed military pacts with governments of majority-Muslim countries, and 
military collaboration to combat jihadism has taken place extensively across the Muslim 
world (Cockburn, 2014). Yet in opposition to politicians’ reassurances of Muslim-Western 
solidarity, New Atheist writers take an opposing, normative view. For them, not only is the 
War on Terror a conflict against Islam (and religion itself), but moreover, it should be.  
Earlier in the paper it was suggested that the New Atheist writers have little to say 
that is new, or even particularly eloquent, as the Enlightenment thinkers outlined state 
irreligion long before Dawkins, Harris, and Hitchens. Similarly, the tropes of religion as 
inherently violent, Islam as particularly threatening (and irreconcilable with the West), 
Western superiority, and civilizational burden, are little more than New Atheist retellings of 
colonialist discourse. Indeed, New Atheists’ representations of the Islamic Other, and the 
territories inhabited by Muslim majorities, reads as little more than a retelling of the 
‘imaginative geographies’ (Gregory 2004: 12) of Columbian and post-Columbian colonial 
modernity. By representing Islam as an irreconcilable Other, and their territories as part of a 
grand geopolitical script, New Atheist writings create an artificial binary wherein ‘an optical… 
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disciplined … standardized space’ of Western modernity and a ‘primitive, wild, and… 
capricious’ (Gregory 2004: 3-4) doppelgänger act out a hackneyed political, geopolitical, and 
civilizational script. New Atheists’ portrayal of Islam not only as territorially definable, and an 
object capable of being controlled and even subdued by Western imaginaries of state 
discipline, bears more than a few similarities with the Orientalist gaze. However two 
noticeable distinctions make New Atheist geopolitical narratives noteworthy.  
First, as alluded to above, is the mass circulation and popularity of New Atheist 
narratives. Between 2008 and 2014 The God Delusion sold more than three million copies 
and has been translated into thirty-five languages,iv while Sam Harris’ and Christopher 
Hitchens’ books, like those of Dawkins, enjoyed record periods in the upper echelons of the 
New York Times bestseller list. These books did not appear in isolation, but during the high 
point of neoconservative rhetoric surrounding the early Blair-Bush GWOT campaigns – and 
Western backlashes against both – following 9/11. This provided a nourishing climate for 
popular, digestible pop-politics books which spoke to the re-ignition of centuries-old Western 
fears of Islam (Said 2003b: 55-64) and offered a seductive geopolitical script in an era of 
growing domestic and international concerns on the relationship between state, faith, and 
violence.  
Second is a normative dissonance between ‘classical’ Orientalism and the pithy 
spatialisations of the New Atheists. Said identifies Orientalism as a series of politicised 
representations embedded in cultural practices – as Gregory (2004: 8) defines, using Marx; 
‘“they cannot represent themselves, so they must be represented.” The New Atheists, 
though, do not simply represent the Islamic Other as a deviation to be categorised and 
controlled, either through phenomenological technologies of culture or through overt 
military and administrative force. As outlined below, New Atheists advocate a much more 
emphatic political agenda which seeks not to subjugate the Other, but to eliminate the very 
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cultures which define her. Where Said saw the imaginative geographies of Orientalism as 
attempts to control the Other by slotting her into a vague and often arbitrary series of 
categories (Said 2003a: 56-58) in a crude binary of ‘our land-barbarian land’ (Said 2003a: 54), 
New Atheist texts expand the geopolitical script of Islam/Muslim into a synecdoche of ‘un-
Western/un-modern’ which acquires a somewhat fuzzy status between territorial and 
deterritorialised category. By replicating the artificial civilised/savage binary of imaginative 
geographies (see especially Gregory 2004: 47-75) and a political and geopolitical agenda 
framed by belief in a Manichean struggle in which one must not simply subordinate another 
but expunge it, the New Atheists replicate the sweeping narrative of Said – but with a visible, 
sinister call to use this narrative to influence policymaking.  
Dawkins, Harris and Hitchens supported the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, and 
Harris and Hitchens the Iraq invasion in 2003 (the latter two being particularly outspoken in 
their support of the War on Terror). Core themes can be identified among popular New 
Atheist writers. Arguably their dominant theme is that institutionalised religion – any religion 
– is dangerous and will inevitably lead to negative consequences. Islam draws criticism from 
New Atheists who deny claims that there is a distinction between Islam and Islamic jihadism, 
and argue that allied governments are incapable of winning the war as they cannot (or refuse 
to) acknowledge the true nature and scope of the threat facing them. We identify four 
themes in New Atheist writing on the normative relationship between religion, violence, and 
geopolitics. These are: religion automatically begets violence; Islam as the primary religious 
threat; the West as a superior (and apparently homogeneous) civilisation; and finally a 
normative geopolitics which blends the White Man’s Burden with militant irreligion.  
All of these, as will be seen, are anathema to critical geopolitical inquiry. 
 
1) Religion begets violence 
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‘Mothers were skewered on swords as their children watched. Young women were 
stripped and raped in broad daylight, then… set on fire. A pregnant woman’s belly 
was slit open, her foetus raised skywards on the tip of the sword and then tossed 
onto one of the fires that blazed across the city’ (Harris 2004: 27). 
 
The first chapter of Sam Harris’ The End of Faith (2004) reproduces the above report of 
Muslim-Hindu communal violence in India. It frames Harris’ vision that such atrocity cannot 
be explained by ‘rational’ factors such as economics or political factionalism, as ‘the only 
difference between these groups consists in what they believe about God’ (Harris 2004: 24). 
This may be an extreme example but it serves to illustrate one of the defining a priori 
assumption of New Atheist thought; that religion of all forms inevitably creates violence, 
which can be wholly explained by religion while political, social and historical factors are 
dismissed as marginal or irrelevant. As Harris boldly opines ‘religion is the most prolific 
source of violence in our history’ (2004: 27) 
Hitchens echoes this belief in God is Not Great (2007). His first substantive chapter, 
‘Religion Kills’, offers a narrative in which Hitchens selects various places beginning with the 
letter ‘B,’ taking the reader on a mind-map tour of the ‘religiously-inspired cruelty’ he has 
witnessed as a journalist in Belfast, Bosnia, Baghdad, Belgrade, Bethlehem and Beirut. In all 
these cases, he claims: ‘once again, religion had poisoned everything’ (2007: 14 [emphasis in 
original]).   
The New Atheists regard religious beliefs as impervious to political reasoning and 
thus inevitably productive of violence when taken to their logical conclusion. On this basis, 
they conclude that organised religions represent an existential threat to rational, secular 
liberal democracy. Because followers of a faith live in ‘a world beyond reason’ (Harris 2007: 
39) and because religions ‘place their adherents beyond the reach of every peaceful 
persuasion,’ secularism must be defended by not only argument but also force. This view 
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maps out simplistic geopolitical imaginaries of the War on Terror.  In the introduction to Sam 
Harris’ Letter to a Christian Nation (Harris 2011), Dawkins (2011: ix) writes ‘I think that the 
crimes done in the name of religion really do follow from religious faith.’  Thus the 
September 2001 attacks can be explained purely by virtue of the religiosity of the attackers. 
Referring to a traditional Islamic belief in sexual rewards for devout males in the afterlife, he 
writes that ‘testosterone-sodden young men too unattractive to get a woman in this world 
might be desperate enough to go for 72 private virgins in the next.’ For Dawkins (2001), the 
9/11 attacks exclusively ‘came from religion,’ the ‘deadly weapon’ which is ‘the underlying 
source of the divisiveness in the Middle East.’  
Startlingly, yet in-keeping with the unwitting re-telling of Orientalist imaginary 
geographies, the New Atheists present al-Qaeda as apolitical. This offers an insight into the 
scripted dynamic of New Atheist geopolitics in which only the (apparently) secularised West 
is rational – any indication of rational political agency in the ‘barbaric lands’ (Gregory 2004) is 
simply reclassified in a lumpencategory of “irrational religiosity”. This automatically strips 
anti-Western groups of a rational agenda or objectives, as demoting them into a religious 
rather than political movement abnegates any Western effort to reconcile, pursue pacific 
geopolitics, or even acknowledge the Other as legitimate. The false binary of a geopolitical 
script defined not only by civilised and savage but by an existential, apocalyptic struggle 
between good and evil, is perpetuated; the ‘blowback’ from complex and intertwined 
histories and geographies of Middle East and US politics (Johnson, 2002), tensions and 
struggles within the Arab societies from which the attackers came, and the grievances and 
goals of the attackers, have no place in this story. It is thus unsurprising that Dawkins, 
although he opposed the Iraq intervention, was sympathetic to the invasion of Afghanistan 
(Kennard 2013). 
The belief that all religions are an affront to rational thought and peace is a standard 
assumption in the core New Atheist texts. Yet a hierarchy of iniquity seems to exist, with 
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special ire directed at Islam.  
 
2) Islam as existential threat 
Dawkins has increasingly singled out Islam as ‘one of the great evils in the world’ (Dawkins, 
2011). He is disparaging of the attempts to differentiate moderate from violent Islam, as 
‘respect for religion enables religious extremism’ (Dawkins 2006). Harris reflects this, 
dissecting Qur’anic and Hadithic beliefs about Islam being a final revelation and there being 
a distinct geopolitical imperative to spread the religion and punish blasphemers, heretics, 
and apostates. The problem with fundamentalist Islam, he argues, is precisely its 
fundamentals: to convert, subjugate, or kill infidels (Harris 2014). He is exasperated with 
Western moderates who refuse to accept the writings of jihadists at face value and explain 
away their actions in terms of political and social grievances. ‘We can ignore all of these 
things,’ Harris argues, ‘because the world is filled with poor, uneducated, and exploited 
peoples who do not commit acts of terrorism’ (2004, 108). Observing that the 9/11 attackers 
were ‘well-educated, middle class,’ he argues that rather than try and seek hidden 
psychological explanations it is more reasonable to assume that ‘men like Bin Laden actually 
believe what they say they believe… in the literal truth of the Koran’ and its promise of a 
reward in the afterlife for those who die in the service of Islam (2004: 28-9). 
Hitchens shares this view, perceiving ‘the raucous propaganda of Mecca and Medina’ 
as the greatest religious threat to liberal societies founded on ‘the rational’ (2007: 332). 
Although he believes that Islam is based on superstition and a contradictory pastiche of pre-
Islamic beliefs, foreign texts, and belief systems plundered from Byzantium (2007: chapter 9), 
it nonetheless inspires masses to violence. For Hitchens, Islam's gravest threat is its 
intolerance of free speech. As a result it has succeeded in intimidating and silencing those 
who would question or reject it across a substantial swathe of the planet (Anthony 2010). In 
a prescient foretelling of ISIS, Hitchens believed Islamic terrorists were hoping to redraw the 
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Middle East map, because ‘they don’t think Iraq should exist. They don’t recognise the 
borders of Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine – they think it should all be part of a huge Islamic 
caliphate’ (Hitchens: 2005a). The overthrow of the Taliban was welcomed by most Afghans as 
liberation from an ‘atrocious tyranny’: indeed, Afghanistan ‘is the first country to be bombed 
out of the Stone Age’ (Hitchens 2008a: 67). 
Dawkins, Harris, and Hitchens are convinced that jihadist violence is a direct, logical 
and indeed inevitable consequence of Islam. For the New Atheists, this makes Islam an 
irreconcilable and existential threat to a Western society which, despite the blood-soaked 
pages of its own history, they interpret as historically superior. 
 
3) Western superiority 
New Atheist renderings of the War on Terror are not unanimous, but a theme emerges. In 
the New Atheist narrative the Western allies are the violated innocent, faced with monstrous 
irrationality rooted in a backward religion (Hitchens 2001a). This threat, they argue, is 
inevitable as the War on Terror is a clash of unequal civilisations, with the West as the 
dominant civilisation. This is a rather poor telling of geopolitics. In the immediate aftermath 
of 9/11, as Dalby (2003) shows, geopolitical designations of the attacks were up for grabs, 
with profound consequences for subsequent responses. The New Atheists' interventions 
reinforced dominant narratives of the nature of the struggle as moral-metaphysical rather 
than political, and the nature of the enemy as indelibly irrational and dangerous. Thus 
geopolitical contest becomes framed as an inevitable conflict that could not be resolved by 
debate, diplomacy, or international law, only weaponry. 
 This is fused to a disparaging view of Islam as backwards and at an inferior stage of 
development. ‘All the world’s Muslims,’ tweeted Dawkins in 2011, ‘have fewer Nobel Prizes 
than Trinity College, Cambridge.’'v Similarly, civilisational superiority can be identified as a 
factor behind Hitchens’ support of the Iraq War. He regarded Saddam Hussein’s regime as an 
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example of the fanatical form of Islam that so endangered the West, which the West 
mistakenly regarded as secular (2004, 29-31). How does Hitchens – whose earlier career was 
marked by his identification with the anti-war movement (Hitchens 2002a) – reach this 
startling position? We contend that it is a product of a geopolitical vision informed by his 
particular understanding of theism and atheism. The 9/11 attacks led him to feel 
‘exhilaration’ because it was no longer possible to underestimate the threat posed to secular 
civilisation, and clarified that the allies were involved in an ‘unmistakable confrontation 
between everything I loved and everything I hated’ (Hitchens 2008a, 63). This secular 
Western pluralism was only achieved ‘after several wars and revolutions had ruthlessly 
smashed the hold of the clergy’, and Hitchens is proud that he has spent his life 'on the 
atheist side of the argument’ (Hitchens 2004a). In contrast, those who use violence to 
enforce Sharia law’s ‘Bronze Age morality’ are ‘morons and philistines who hate Darwin and 
Einstein’ (Hitchens, 2002b). As medieval Christianity shows, ‘you cannot run anything but a 
primeval and cruel and stupid society out of the precepts of one rather mediocre 
“revelation”’ (ibid). 
 Notwithstanding this painfully simplistic essentialisation of medieval histories, this 
sentiment is echoed by Harris’ support of allied military interventions. Harris' vision is 
consequently framed by a stark geopolitical script which pits secular against sacred, sober 
atheist versus zealous theist, and Western civilisation against Islamic barbarism, with no 
room for subtleties or distinctions. Explicitly endorsing Huntington’s ‘clash of civilisation’ 
thesis (2004a, 130) and excoriating the liberal dogma of successive US and UK governments 
that they are not at war with Islam, Harris insists ‘We are at war with Islam,’ not merely with 
‘an otherwise peaceful religion that has been “hijacked” by extremists’ (2004a, 109).   
 While Christianity was initially, and occasionally still, the target of the New Atheists, 
the particular contempt which they reserve for Islam is reflected clearly in their language (Al-
Jazeera 2015, Ong 2016). For Hitchens, the allies are right to fight the jihadists (‘the scum of 
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the earth,’ Hitchens, 2001b) and should ‘be willing and able, if not in fact eager, to kill them 
without pity’ (Hitchens, 2002b). Indeed, Harris concludes The End of Faith by calling for a 
new Enlightenment to be attempted ‘on the sole condition that we banish all religions from 
the discourse,’ and to do that ‘it has become necessary to know the enemy, and to prepare 
to fight it’ (Hitchens, 2007, 41). Those who must fight, he argues, are Western nations who 
must carry the burden of a self-appointed moral authority. 
 
4) The Western Man’s Burden 
Dawkins (2003) was scornful of the religiosity of President Bush, but a critical geopolitical 
reading of his interventions suggests they can be read as (inadvertently) supportive of the 
logic behind GWOT based not merely on defence against an apparently irrational and 
homogenous other, but upon an imagined Western duty. As Eagleton (2009) points out, 
Dawkins: 
 
Preached a self-satisfied, old-fashioned Whiggish rationalism that can be 
wielded against a benighted Islam…whether they like it or not, Dawkins 
and his ilk have become weapons in the war on terror… Western 
supremacism has gravitated from the Bible to atheism (Eagleton 2009). 
 
 ‘Some propositions are so dangerous that it may even be ethical to kill people for 
believing them,’ Harris writes in a startling passage (2004: 52-3). If such people ‘cannot be 
captured... otherwise tolerant people may be justified in killing them in self-defence’ (ibid). 
Faced with such a threat, a peaceful geopolitics is ‘flagrantly immoral’ (2004: 199) and the 
allies must be prepared to countenance further wars. Thus he writes that ‘however mixed or 
misguided our intentions were in launching [the Iraq war], we are attempting, at 
considerable cost to ourselves, to improve life for the Iraqi people’ (Harris 2005). At the same 
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time, racial profiling is ostensibly justified: ‘We should profile Muslims, or anyone who looks 
like he or she could conceivably be Muslim, and we should be honest about it’ (Harris: 2012). 
This increasingly sinister logic translates – ironically, considering the New Atheists' 
denouncement of the apparent barbarisms of Islam alongside praise for Western morals – 
into support for judicial torture as a lesser evil than the terrorism it may prevent (2004: 194-
5). At its extreme this argument posits that ‘Muslims pose a special problem for nuclear 
deterrence’ (2004: 128). The possibility of a theocracy combining Iron Age philosophy with 
21st century military technology fuels, for Harris, an unsubstantiated assertion that because 
Muslims do not fear death, the fear of ‘Mutually Assured Destruction’ would not hold for an 
‘Islamist regime armed with long-range nuclear weapons.’ Harris’ proposed solution (2004: 
129) to this hypothetical scenario offers the most chilling insight of New Atheist geopolitik: 
that ‘the only thing likely to ensure our survival may be a nuclear first strike of our own’. 
Harris concedes that this would not be welcome – indeed, it would be ‘an unthinkable crime’ 
– but it may be ‘the only course of action available to us, given what Islamists believe’ (ibid.). 
 If Sam Harris advances the implications of Richard Dawkins’ equivocation, Hitchens 
openly relishes the violence of GWOT. He scorns those who opposed the US and UK invasions 
of Afghanistan and Iraq and interpreted 9/11 as a reaction to U.S. foreign policy. By 
representing ‘the worst face of Islam as the voice of the oppressed’ (Hitchens: 2004a) the 
peace-movement has become ‘fellow-travellers with fascism’ (Hitchens: 2004b). In refusing 
to stand in solidarity with pro-democracy and pro-women opponents of Islamist regimes, the 
anti-war Western left (with which he once identified) thereby showed itself synonymous 
with ‘a sort of affectless, neutralist, smirking isolationism’ (Hitchens 2008b: 108). He relished 
his break with the ‘peace movement’ of which he was once a member, writing that he 
‘wanted it to rain’ on their anti-war demonstration (Hitchens 2008e), and crowing ‘Ha Ha Ha 
to the pacifists’ as the US overthrew the Taliban regime (2001b). But his scorn for former 
comrades on the left was nothing compared to how he despised the jihadists: 
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We can’t live on the same planet as them, and I’m glad because I don’t 
want to. I don’t want to breathe the same air as these psychopaths and 
murders [sic] and rapists and torturers and child abusers… It’s a duty and a 
responsibility to defeat them. But it’s also a pleasure. I don’t regard it as a 
grim task at all (Cited in Cavanaugh, 2009, 219). 
 
Indeed, for Hitchens the Afghanistan invasion was to be applauded because peace with Islam 
‘is neither possible, nor desirable’ (Hitchens, 2011) and the Iraq invasion was ‘a war to be 
proud of’ (Hitchens, 2005b). ‘How did I get Iraq wrong?’ he asks rhetorically amidst much 
hand-wringing by pundits on the fifth anniversary of the invasion. ‘I didn’t,’ was his 
unrepentant reply to former allies on the left who now excoriated him as a ‘model apostate’ 
(Finkelstein, 2008). 
 Of course, it would be unfair to tar all atheists with the same brush. For Richard 
Seymour, Hitchens had become ‘a poetaster of genocide’ whose ‘deranged fantasies about 
killing more and more evil-doers’ attracted support only amongst Republican-voting 
‘malodorous macho assholes’ and ‘post-pubescent neophytic imperialists’ (Seymour 2008: 
326). Hitchens' borderline sadism is no more indicative of a homogeneous atheist bloc than 
the Taliban are of a homogeneous Islam – because neither exists. Yet he does symbolise 
identifiable strands of thinking among the dominant New Atheist writers. At the heart of 
Hitchens’ extraordinary support of the War on Terror was his geopolitical vision. He was 
critical of both the visions of George W. Bush and what he called ‘the peaceniks,’ each of 
whom he accused of invoking geopolitical scripts (Dalby 2003; Dalby 2007) based on previous 
scenarios which no longer acted as adequate explanatory frameworks. Instead, this new 
situation should be seen as a clash between secular and religious visions of organising 
society: indeed, the Taliban-bin Laden alliance represented for Hitchens ‘an elemental 
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challenge’ to secular liberalism (Hitchens 2001a) based not on rational political grievances 
but the ‘insults’ of seeing ‘unveiled women, democracy, Jews, homosexuals, two-
dimensional art, Hinduism, and the like’ (ibid). Theirs was ‘an assault on all civilisation’ 
(Hitchens 2008c). And in a synecdoche of New Atheist writings, the solution is simple: 
violence. An irony indeed for a philosophy whose most vociferous proponents so loudly 
decry slaughter in the name of an idea.  
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
New Atheism provided outspoken and vociferous support for the disastrous US and 
UK ‘Global War on Terror,’ and thus the critical analysis of it is both intellectually and 
politically important. Dawkins reduced the complicated and murky geopolitics of Western 
entanglements in the Middle East and Central Asia to the flat terrains of rational 
enlightenment versus irrational Islam. Hitchens relished lethal violence against ‘Islamic 
fascism.’ Harris was seemingly open to the possibility that in the war against Islam, racial 
profiling, torture, and killing people for simply professing certain beliefs were acceptable. At 
its extreme, Harris’ version of contemporary global geopolitics ends with a suggestion that 
we seriously consider a pre-emptive thermonuclear strike on an Islamic country that 
acquired nuclear technology.  
 These striking incitements to violence are based upon a vision in which the essential 
dynamic of global geopolitics is an imaginative geography on which is played out an 
apocalyptic, eschatological struggle between the West and Islam. Atheism is not incidental to 
this. At the core of this geopolitical vision is a fundamental belief that ‘religion poisons 
everything’ and that an endangered rational, pluralistic secular civilisation should be 
defended by arguments and armaments against the forces of theocracy. Although Dawkins, 
Harris, and Hitchens argue that atheism and theism are distinguished by an absence-
presence dichotomy according to which atheism is innocent – as nobody will die for a lack of 
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belief – (Al Jazeera 2015) their geopolitical scripts reveal that this is an illusion. The obvious 
irony here is that writers who seemingly ground much of their opposition to religion on the 
argument that it is violent end up implicitly or explicitly justifying extraordinary degrees of 
violence themselves in the name of overcoming religion. We suggest four possible 
explanations of this apparent paradox. 
 The first is that atheism is not inherently violent, but in this particular case the New 
Atheists might be right. Perhaps there is a life-and-death civilizational struggle taking place 
between a certain form of Islam and liberal secularism, and this war does need fighting 
(Hitchens 2008d; Hitchens 2011). This is certainly how some Muslims perceive it. Abu Bakr 
Al-Baghdadi, self-proclaimed Caliph of so-called Islamic State, said ‘Islam was never a religion 
of peace. Islam is the religion of fighting,’ in an address that called on Muslims the world over 
to join the violent struggle against the enemies of Islam (BBC 2015). Al-Baghdadi does not 
objectively and authentically represent Islam – who does? – but the traction that ISIS has 
created suggests that his vision is neither as marginal nor obscure as his detractors would like 
to believe. We would question this geopolitical account of civilizational struggle, and regard 
the Western interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya as disastrous. Nonetheless, the New 
Atheists’ charge that liberals have failed to take jihadism seriously in its own terms cannot be 
easily dismissed. 
 A second explanation, after Sigmund Freud, is that the violence of militant atheism is 
a product of its similarity to religion. In The Future of an Illusion, Freud contends that 
religions provide the psychological goods of belonging and comfort and, if eliminated, people 
seek an earthly figurehead to replace their lost spiritual father. In a hauntingly prescient 
passage, he argued that in order to eliminate religion from European civilisation ‘you can 
only do it by means of another system of doctrines; and such a system would from the outset 
take over all the psychological characteristics of religion – the same sanctity, rigidity and 
intolerance’ (Freud 1973 [1927]: 47). It is possible to see a validation of Freud’s thesis in the 
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emergence of the Third Reich and Stalinism. Peter Sloterdijk revisits this argument by saying 
that in moving towards ‘atheistic world projects’ the Enlightenment replicated religion and 
‘released an immanent zealotry that – because it was incapable of grace – even surpassed 
the religious variety in strictness, anger and violence’ (Sloterdijk 2010: 136). It could be that 
this psychological tradition can explain how the New Atheists have, in rejecting violence, 
become apologists for violence. 
Thirdly, a more historically situated explanation is advanced by William Cavanaugh in 
his book The Myth of Religious Violence (2009). Drawing on historical sociology, he argues 
that ‘religion’ is a recent analytical category that appeared with the rise of the modern state. 
The ‘myth’ is that there is a transhistorical, transcultural feature of human life called ‘religion’ 
which is essentially distinct from the ‘secular’ political sphere. The depiction of ‘religion’ as 
inherently prone to violence is one of the ‘foundational legitimating myths of the liberal 
nation-state,’ which sets itself up as the rational, peace-making subject which must use force 
to tame the fanatical and irrational religious Other. This myth is used to reconfigure power by 
marginalising certain groups (especially Muslims) and underwrite the monopoly of the state 
to exercise violence. In this narrative, because Muslims have not learnt to remove the 
dangerous influence of religion from public life, ‘their violence is therefore irrational and 
fanatical’ whereas ours, being secular, ‘is rational, peace-making and sometimes regrettably 
necessary.’ We find ourselves ‘obliged to bomb them into liberal democracy’ (Cavanaugh 
2009: 3-4). 
 This would appear an apt explanation of the position of the New Atheists who, 
Cavanaugh contends, are classic examples of the uncritical espousal of the myth of religious 
violence. They work with a simple dichotomy of religion=violence and atheism=peace, and 
interpret all data to fit this assumption. Thus in The God Delusion Dawkins interprets all 
violence done by ‘religious’ people as proceeding inexorably from their religion, whereas 
atheism is entirely incidental to the violence of atheist regimes such as the USSR: ‘why would 
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anyone go to war for the sake of an absence of belief?’ he quips incredulously (Dawkins 2007 
316). In similar sophistry, Hitchens decries apparently religious people who do not advocate 
violence as, for Hitchens, they are not really religious. As Cavanaugh observes, ‘Religion 
poisons everything because Hitchens identifies everything poisonous as religious’ (ibid, 218). 
For Hitchens, therefore, ‘The problem with religion is that it kills for the wrong reasons,’ 
whereas killing for atheism is not only right but pleasing (Cavanaugh 2009). The New Atheists 
end up advocating violence not because atheism is inherently violent, but because their 
version leads them to an uncritical invocation of the Myth of Religious Violence. 
Finally, a fourth explanation is that as a philosophy which emerged in reaction to 
Western monotheism, atheism is as tainted by violence as theistic belief systems. This 
argument is made by theologians who suggest that by eliminating the ideas both of binding 
moral laws provided by a creator, and of humans as sacred beings made in God’s image, 
atheism eliminates inherent restraints on violence (see McGrath 2005). By this argument, 
atheism has an intrinsic tendency to violence. However, it is important to note that although 
these writers’ variants of atheism structure geopolitical visions that led them to endorse 
violence, it is not possible to generalise from them about ‘atheism’ as a whole. New Atheism 
is not representative of all atheists, any more than the death-cult of Daesh or the 
homophobes of the Westboro Baptist Church represent all Muslims or all Christians 
respectively. Nevertheless they indicate the continuation of an Orientalist binary and 
geographies that are not only imaginative, but nightmarish in their division of the world into 
territorially-bound moral absolutes. Further research is needed on the place of different 
ideas and region-specific practices of atheism in fostering geopolitical visions that are 
productive of violence or of peace.  
We finish by reiterating our argument that such research is the proper task of critical 
geopolitical enquiry. The designation of parts of the world as dangerous spaces populated by 
dangerous people who believe dangerous things which therefore requires the policy 
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response of war on the part of enlightened people who inhabit more advanced spaces, 
continues to act as an incitement to violence. The task of Critical Geopolitics remains that of 
understanding and challenging these militaristic mappings, and explicating alternative 
geographies of the world that are productive of more pacific ways of living together. There is 
room within this enterprise for a diversity of theoretical approaches and methods. Nor 
should we lose sight of the truth that Critical Geopolitics is, like all scientific endeavour, a 
collaborative project: depending upon abilities, inclinations, positions and opportunities, it is 
perfectly acceptable for different scholars to make very different contributions to this field. 
Indeed, we think it is enriched by this very diversity.  
For example, ‘New Atheist’ online communities have come into being and offer what 
McGrath describes as “a sense of shared identity and solidarity” (McGrath, 2011: 26). The 
analysis that we provide is a necessary starting point, but we recognise that it is an 
insufficient exploration of the New Atheist phenomenon in the absence of ’audience studies’ 
work on these communities along the lines of that suggested by Dittmer and Gray (2010). 
That is beyond the scope of this paper, but we hope that our initial foray will lead to further 
research into this area. 
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